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ON THE ISSUES DIVIDING CONTEMPORARY
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHERS AND THEOLOGIANS
James A. Keller

Recently Gordon Kaufman published an article in Faith and Philosophy in
which he gave some reasons why contemporary theologians are not much
interested in the issue of evidentialism. Still more recently Eleonore Stump
and Norman Kretzmann replied to it. In this paper I argue that their reply
does not engage the issue which concerns the theologian. I try to define that
issue and show what implications it has for the usefulness to Christian theologians
of the work of Christian philosophers of religion.

Recently in an article in Faith and Philosophy Gordon Kaufman gave some
reasons why contemporary theologians are not much interested in the issue
of evidentialism. 1 Still more recently Eleonore Stump and Norman
Kretzmann replied in the same journaI.2 I want to continue the discussion.
The burden of my remarks will be that, contrary to Stump and Kretzmann, a
variety of factors may well render theologians like Kaufman justified in
having little interest in what philosophers like them are doing (though they
also may be justified in what they are doing).

Kaufman s Article
Kaufman's article is set in the context of his observation that though there is
considerable ferment in both contemporary Christian theology and contemporary philosophy of religion, the theologians and the philosophers engaged
in each of these enterprises do not seem to be in much communication with
each other. So Kaufman proposes to explain why he (and presumably some
other theologians) do not have much interest in what is going on in contemporary
philosophy of religion; he focuses on the current discussion of evidentialism as
a particular issue much discussed by philosophers of religion and gives three
reasons why theologians have little interest in it. I point out the broader context
of his discussion because it will be important for my later comments.
Kaufman begins with the claim that "evidentialist arguments are addressed
to specific beliefs held by adherents of a particular religious tradition: does
the evidence favor belief A or ... weigh against it?" (39). Even recent questionings of the rational appropriateness of the demand for evidence, he adds,
also involve evidentialist arguments. Such arguments are internal to the tradition in the sense that they assume that the claims, concepts, and terminology
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of that tradition frame the crucial issues; the only matter to be decided is
whether the claims are true or false. But "wider questions, about the nature
of traditions or worIdviews themselves and how these function in human
experience and thinking, do not ordinarily come up for direct consideration
in these discussions" (39). But many theologians have become very concerned with precisely these wider issues, so evidentialist arguments hold little
interest for them. Kaufman states that there are many reasons for this shift
in interest among theologians; he gives three.
The first of these is an increased consciousness of the significance of
religious pluralism. In the past most Christians have responded to other faiths
by claiming that Christian beliefs are true and all others which contradict
them are false. But now many theologians are appreciative of other religions
(and of other traditions within Christianity) and believe that their own understanding of Christian faith and life may be illuminated by things learned from
adherents of other traditions (both inside and outside Christianity).
Closely related to this reason is the second: "the emergence of new theories
about the ways in which cultural and linguistic symbolic or conceptual frames
shape all our experiencing and thinking" (40). This, along with the new attitude
toward pluralism has made theologians dubious about the status of truth-claims
in religions. The function of religious language has come to be seen as not so
much the making of truth-claims but the presenting of a framework within which
meaning for human life can be found (41). So theologians have become concerned with questions like how certain concepts originated, how they functioned
in human life, and what the consequences were of employing them. One result
is that theologians have become very tentative about all ways of conceptualizing the central realities in the Christian faith-e.g., God and Christ; Kaufman can even speak of a sort of agnosticism about these realities (44). Not
surprisingly, they also doubt the traditional way(s) of conceiving these realities. If this is the position of the theologians, they will have little interest in
evidentialist arguments about some particular conception.
The third reason is the confrontation with appalling evil in the twentieth
century-e.g., world wars, the holocaust, the ecological crisis. Combined
with this has been the conviction that Christian faith bears "some significant
responsibility" for most of those evils. This has led theologians to inquire
into what other traditions might have to offer and to look with new intensity
at the ways "Christian symbols, practices and institutions have actually functioned in human life" (42).
Kaufman concludes by sketching what he believes to be the context within
which many theologians approach questions having to do with primary religious symbols like God. They feel that at the base of all existence is a profound
mystery about which their symbols speak, but they have no certainty of
the aptness of the concepts used to conceptualize it or of the correctness
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of any of the claims made about it, including traditional ones. Moreover, they
believe that claims to certainty of knowledge suggest a sinful desire to control
that mystery at the base of our humanity, the mystery Christians name God.

Stump and Kretzmann s Reply
Stump and Kretzmann present Kaufman's three reasons and respond to each.
To his point about religious pluralism, they note that pluralism does not
preclude the truth of certain religious claims, nor does belief in the truth of
the doctrines of one's own religion necessarily lead to intolerance toward
contradictory doctrines or to lack of sympathy toward those who believe
them. They also point out that his agnosticism about God implies that he must
deny religious claims made by non-Christian theists as well as those made
by Christian theists, so his position also implies the falsity of the truth-claims
of other religions. To his point about Christian responsibility for the evils of
the world, they question whether Christians are in fact responsible. But more
importantly, they claim that even if Christians were responsible, that would
not show that Christian doctrines are not true, for many people act in ways
which violate the precepts of their worldview.
However, their main attention is focused on responding to Kaufman's point
about relativism and to the agnosticism about God to which it leads. His
cultural relativism is, they say, self-defeating. What is the status of the claim
that all truth-claims are relative to a conceptual system? If that is relative to
Kaufman's conceptual system, why should philosophers be concerned with it?
If it is a non-relative claim, then non-relative truth-claims are possible. They also
claim that Kaufman's practice is not consistent with his relativism. For example, he makes claims about what is really evil (the holocaust, the ecological
crisis); and he tells us things about God, such as that God is unknowable and
that to "'try to make ourselves the ultimate disposers of our lives and destiny'
is to 'sin against God'" (336, citing 44).
They conclude by suggesting that the most powerful of the motives which
have led theologians to turn to preliminary questions about the role of
worldviews and away from the traditional doctrines discussed by contemporary philosophers of religion is "the theologians' growing suspicion that the
traditional doctrines could not be taken seriously by intelligent, sophisticated,
twentieth-century academics" (337). Implicit in this remark is the suggestion
that the discussions by contemporary philosophers of religion show that this
suspicion is unfounded. Therefore, Stump and Kretzmann invite the theologians to join them in these discussions.

Disagreements about the Fundamental Issue and Their Implications
Both Kaufman's article and Stump and Kretzmann's response are richer than
my brief summaries convey, but I believe that I have at least outlined the
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essence of the positions of each. In the space which remains I want to assess
the reply and to defend a position like Kaufman's or at least to respond to
Stump and Kretzmann in a way sympathetic to what I believe to be the
theologian's concerns. Since my response involves some interpretive modifications and additions to Kaufman's article, I would not want to claim that
it is exactly his position, but I think it captures the spirit of what he was
suggesting. At least it will convey my understanding of what he was driving
at and of the context of contemporary theology which his article reflects.
Thus, even if my additional comments do not represent his position, I hope
that they will contribute to an understanding of the differences between contemporary theologians and contemporary philosophers of religion.
First, a brief assessment. I think that Stump and Kretzmann's response is
correct, given what they understand to be the issues. The fact of pluralism
does not logically imply that no position is true, nor does the belief that one's
position is true necessarily imply that one will be intolerant of those who
hold other positions. Failure to live by a code does not show that the precepts
of the code or its associated doctrines are false. To say that we can know nothing
about God implies that we know at least one thing about God-viz., that God is
a reality about which we can know nothing. As logical points these are unexceptionable. If these are the issues, Stump and Kretzmann have rebutted Kaufman's
reasons. And yet I cannot shake the feeling that they have not engaged the issues
as Kaufman understands them. This is a rather bold claim on my part. Let me try
to defend it by suggesting what I think their rebuttal overlooks.
I suggest that theologians of today are greatly concerned not about truth
and truth-claims, but about the effects in the lives of believers which are
associated with adhering to various beliefs. 3 Religion, they might say, is
primarily concerned not with giving us truths about God but with mediating
our salvation. From this perspective, the truth of the beliefs is secondary to
the effects which holding them have in the lives of believers, in the community of believers, and in the larger world of which believers are a part.
That this is Kaufman's position, or more generally that of many theologians
today, is not as central in his article as I make it in my comments. But there
are indications in Kaufman's article that he would agree, most notably his
references to the theologian's concern for the way religious symbols actually
function in the religious community (42) and for the consequences of their
employment (36); his mention of alleged Christian responsibility for evils as
one of the three reasons he discusses; and his claim that the function of
religious language "has come to be seen not so much as the making of
truth-claims but the presenting of a framework within which meaning for
human life can be found" (41). However, I make this claim also on the basis
of my own reading of contemporary theologians. 4
Assume for a minute that this is the theologian's underlying concern. Note its
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implications for the points on which Stump and Kretzmann criticized Kaufman. First, consider their point that failure to live by a code does not show
that the code or its associated doctrines are false. Of course not. But if those
who profess a code and its doctrines often do not live by it and if others who do
not profess the code often live in ways which its professors should, then one has
to wonder whether professing the code has any point. If, for the sake of argument,
Christianity does not motivate most of its adherents to resist great evils, then
what does it matter if its doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are true?
Second, consider the point about religious pluralism. Of course, simply
being convinced of the truth of one's position does not logically imply that
one must be intolerant. But there has been much intolerance among and by
Christians: the persecutions of Christians of different beliefs, the armed struggles over religious differences during and after the Reformation, the tendency
of many Christian groups to use the power of the state to support their own
versions of Christianity, the persecutions of Jews, the doctrine widely held
among certain Christians for centuries that falsehood has no right to exist.
Perhaps these were all aberrations of Christianity, but one has to wonder why
they were so numerous and deep-seated. Why was Christianity so slow to
deal effectively with them? Was there something about Christian doctrine that
blinded Christians to these aberrations (assuming that they were aberrations)?
One might understand also why some theologians might conclude that in our
time the best way to prevent such aberrations is to stress the mystery of God,
how inadequate our conceptions of God's nature are, and how tentative and
undogmatic must be our profession of them.
Third, consider the point about agnosticism about God. To say that we can
know nothing about God is equivalent to saying that God is a being about
whom we can know nothing and thus does make a claim about God. But I
think that what I take to be Kaufman's basic point on this matter can be made
in a way which escapes that criticism. Rather than saying that we can know
nothing about God, he might say that (at least under the present conditions of
human existence) we can never show (or, perhaps, justifiedly claim to know)
that our claims about God are true. This approach at least is not so obviously
open to the charge of inconsistency. Some support for this proposal can be
found in the way Kaufman puts his point about God's being the mystery
which is the source and context of our humanity. He often puts it in the formal
mode, not the material mode, saying "God is the name Christians give to this
mystery," rather than saying "God is this mystery. "5 Kaufman's repeated mention
of the issue of how we conceptualize God also is consistent with this proposal.

Relativism, Cultural Conditioning, and Confessional Theology
But this proposal does not resolve all the inconsistencies which arise in
connection with his agnosticism about God and more generally with his
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relativism, for he also says that doing certain things is a sin against God.
Thus he implies that he knows enough about God to know that something is
a sin against God. One possible response to this difficulty is to distinguish
matters on which we are more justified in being confident from those on
which we are less justified. 6 To judge from other things Kaufman says in the
article, he is far more confident in his judgments about what is evil than he
is in his doctrines about the nature of God. I suggest that he might also say
that he is justified in having these different degrees of confidence. Perhaps
this difference is justified because it is far easier to determine that certain
things are destructive of human beings and of the world they inhabit than it
is to determine the nature of God (i.e., of the mystery which is the source
and context of our humanity); the former realities are available for our observation and study while the latter is not. 7 Moreover, the different conceptual
systems people use seem to have far more influence over how they conceptualize "the mystery which lies at the base of their humanity" than it does
over what things they consider to be destructive of human beings and other
creatures. (To be sure, there are differences over what actions are overall evil,
but these arise primarily because of differences over empirical claims-e.g.,
the Jews caused this or that situation in Germany or a certain practice does
not threaten any long-range damage to the environment.) The theologian may
also feel far more justified in his judgments about what sort of actions and
attitudes are harmful to his relationship with the mystery at the ground of his
being than he is about how to conceptualize that mystery, for the former
judgment can be based on his experience of ruptures in that relationship while
the latter is far less directly related to his experience.
Re-expressing Kaufman's point in terms of degrees of justification for
various beliefs enables us to understand why the theologian may feel little
confidence in the correctness of even his own ways of conceptualizing God.
When he reflects on the important role which conceptual schemes inherited
from one's culture play in conceptualizing the ultimate, he may conclude that
the task of showing the correctness anyone belief formulated in terms of any
one conceptual scheme is so vast and difficult an undertaking that no one
should feel much justified confidence about any formulation. Therefore, he
might decide to focus his energies on matters on which it seems to him more
likely that he can reach a correct judgment-or at least one about whose
correctness he can feel more justified confidence.
Of course, his own judgments about the nature of God are not based on
nothing. In part they are based on his experience of that reality. But his
experience far underdetermines what is claimed about the nature of God. Far
more of what is said about the nature of God by theologians and by Christian
philosophers is determined by the Christian tradition as they have received
and understood it, by other factors in their cultures, and by their own reflec-
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tions. In the case of Stump and Kretzmann in particular, much of their work
is a careful mining and refining of ways of understanding God which were
current in the High Middle Ages. Other Christian philosophers work out of a
Reformed or Episcopalian tradition. Because these traditions tended to accept
such traditiomil doctrines as Nicene Trinitarianism and Chalcedonian Christology,
such Christian philosophers may believe it worthwhile to try to explicate and
show the internal consistency of the claims involved in these doctrines.
But the theologians of whom Kaufman speaks may think this whole enterprise is of little value or interest, a point noted by Stump and Kretzmann in
their conclusion and attributed to the theologian's suspicion that intellectually
sophisticated believers can no longer take these doctrines seriously. However,
I believe that this explanation is too narrow. I suspect that the problem is
more of a general feeling that the traditional formulations are not what William
James termed "live options." Theologians, like philosophers, have their reasons, sometimes rational, sometimes simply causal, for finding something to
be a live option or not to be one. I could illustrate this point with any of several
traditional doctrines, but I shall use the Nicene Trinitarian formulation. This will
allow me to illustrate also what I understand to be Kaufman's point about the
conceptualities and worldviews in terms of which doctrines are formulated.
The Nicene formulation employs a conceptuality of ousiai and hypostaseis,
which was current in the fourth century; today's theologian may find this
foreign to his own way of thinking about the world or even incomprehensible.
He may find other ways of expressing his understanding of God and Christ
more illuminating and helpful. Or the theologian may believe that the doctrine
lacks Biblical support, or that it represents too great an extension into speculative categories for him to have much confidence in it. Or he may think
that factors of imperial politics played too large a role in the outcome for us
to have great confidence in the result. For any or all of these reasons, he may
doubt that being a Christian requires this way of understanding God's presence in Christ and in the Holy Spirit. To be sure, he must acknowledge that
the creed was accepted for centuries by most professing Christians, but he
might point out that particularly in ages which lack the interest and tools of
modem historiography, promulgated traditions would tend to be accepted, for
no one would know how they came to be accepted, and contrary positions
would tend not to be preserved; moreover, he might doubt that the acceptance
of these traditions, as opposed to such Biblical formulations as that God was
in Christ and God is present in the church by the Spirit, actually played a
significant role in the lives of believers and of the church. For these and other
reasons the theologian might not be interested in evidentialist arguments
about the Nicene doctrines. Of course, all these reasons are controversial; I
suggest them not as conclusive reasons against the Nicene doctrines but as
possible motivations for not being interested in discussions aimed at refining
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and/or supporting and/or disproving these doctrines. To be sure, if the doctrines were disproved, that might remove all but historical interest in them.
But the theologian whom Kaufman represents may not even be interested in
attempting a disproof, any more than most of us are interested in attempting a
disproof of various Buddhist or Hindu doctrines. We all think our time is better
spent elsewhere; moreover, we lack the expertise, and we are not interested in
gaining it. As James pointed out, much of what we find to be live or dead
options is not the result of careful prior consideration of those options.
Indeed, we must find an option live before we give it careful consideration.
My suggestions about theologians vis a vis Nicene Trinitarianism were
intended to be illustrative of suggestions which might be made in relation to
many traditional doctrines. I believe that analogous reasons give theologians
like Kaufman motivation for doubts about most traditional doctrines. Such
doubts would be enhanced if one compared doctrines about God's nature
formulated at various times and found important ways in which they reflect
the cultures of the formulators, thus supporting (though not proving) the
generalization that this is always true. 8 If I am right about these alleged
reasons and motivations, it is understandable why the theologian may very
well regard the traditional doctrines about God which occur in evidentialist
arguments as simply culturally conditioned formulations of beliefs by which
some Christians express aspects of their faith. Presumably the Christian theologian
will base his understanding of God on some elements in the Christian tradition
and perhaps on other elements in his culture (as the church fathers did in the
Nicene Creed), but the elements might not be the ones which have been
important for many prior Christians. For the total Christian tradition is far
richer than any particular formulations, and the theologian may find that other
aspects of the tradition or other ways of conceptualizing God and Christ are
more relevant or more adequate to his own Christian experience. And those
will be the topics on which he works. (Philosophers do the same thing.) The
theologian will almost certainly have some beliefs about such doctrinal matters as the nature of God and Christ, by which he expresses his faith. But the
theologian might well regard them also as simply culturally conditioned
formulations of beliefs by which he expresses his faith. Therefore, he may
not have much interest in evidentialist arguments for or against even the
doctrinal formulations he employs. He will be more interested in the effect
which believing them has on the lives of Christians than he is in proving them;
he may even think the latter task impossible or at least so difficult as not to be
worth attempting, or he may not even think that correct and incorrect are appropriate terms of assessment for beliefs about God's nature. This way of practicing
theology may be termed confessional rather than dogmatic, for the theologian is
confessing the understanding by which he lives his life rather than trying to prove
its truth or its superiority over all other conceptions. 9 If he defended his beliefs
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at all, he would do so by showing their roots in some part of the tradition
(especially in the Bible) and their role in enabling him to live a Christian life.

Conclusion
Of course, the theologian may be wrong in his conviction that certain doctrines are only culturally conditioned formulations of beliefs and in the related beliefs I mentioned. But no one can explore every issue. Each of us
must focus on some issues; our choice of issues will be based on many
convictions which we have not examined but which we accept. They will also
be based on factors which are biographical. Many Christian philosophers
today are interested in evidentialist arguments about beliefs related to our
faith. That we are interested in such arguments may have more to do with
our personalities and profession than with our understanding our faith; philosophers qua philosophers tend to be interested in arguments about matters
of truth and meaning. Analogously, the contemporary theologian's interest in
how concepts and beliefs arise and develop and in how they relate to life may
have more to do with his personality and profession than with his understanding of his faith; I have already claimed that theologians qua theologians today
tend to be interested in how religious belief contributes to (and expresses)
the transformation of one's life.
This last point suggests that some differences between the issues which concern contemporary Christian philosophers and those which concern contemporary theologians may be the result of differences between the professions as well
as the other sorts of differences we have considered. Theologians may be more
interested in how beliefs affect people's lives and attitudes than they are in the
accuracy of our understanding of the mystery at the ground of our being. Even
if the Christian philosopher thinks that the theologian is interested in an important
topic, she may claim that a more accurate understanding of that mystery will
promote the desired transformation of lives and attitudes. The philosopher may also
claim that her special expertise is dealing with concepts and with arguments about
the matters in question; on this point I think the theologian must agree. As for the
claim that a more accurate grasp will promote the desired transformation, the
theologian might have two responses. First, he might ask if there is any evidence
that this is so. Have the people with the greatest understanding of these matters
been greatly transformed by their understanding? Second, he might wonder
whether other means of promoting transformation might be even more useful,
either for certain people or for most people (or perhaps even for everyone
except highly skilled philosophers and theologians). The remarks in this
paragraph seem to support the conclusion that division of labor based on
different abilities and interests will limit somewhat the extent to which philosophers and theologians are in communication with each other, at least if,
and as long as, their interests are as different as I have suggested.

77

DIVIDED CHRISTIAN ISSUES

The prospects for close interest in each other's work are also diminished
by the different doctrinal convictions out of which contemporary theologians
like Kaufman and contemporary philosophers of religion like Stump and
Kretzmann work. As I suggested earlier, neither finds the doctrines involved in
much of the work of the other to be a live option. I suggested possible motivations
for the theologian's attitude; I have not explored reasons for the philosopher's
attitude, but perhaps it is simply that none of the theologian's reasons apply to
her. And it may well be that she is justified in investigating what she does and
in having little interest in the theologian's investigations, even if the theologian
is also justified in not being interested in her work. In any event, the division is
not absolute. There are theologians who share the doctrinal convictions of philosophers like Stump and Kretzmann and there are Christian philosophers of
religion who have doubts about the traditional doctrines and who share the
confessional stance of theologians like Kaufman. Members of these two groups
may help promote some mutual influence between theologians like Kaufman and
philosophers like Stump and Kretzmann, but right now they are a minority.
Wofford College
NOTES
1. "Evidentialism: A Theologian's Response," Faith and Philosophy, 6/1 (January
1989), pp. 35-46. (Numbers in parentheses in discussions of Kaufman's ideas refer to this
work.)

2. "Theologically Unfashionable Philosophy," Faith and Philosophy, 7/3 (July 1990),
329-39. (Numbers in parentheses in discussions of Stump and Kretzmann's ideas refer to
this work.)
3. Although I express this generalization unqualifiedly, I do not intend it to apply to all
theologians today or even to all Christian theologians. For llack sufficient acquaintance
with the views of non-Christian theologians to offer generalizations about their positions
or motivations. Nor do I think that the generalization is true of even all Christian
theologians. But I suggest that it is true of at least most of those Christian theologians
whose position Kaufman's original article represents. Unless otherwise noted, henceforth
theologians refers to them. Also, for the sake of convenience, I will use masculine
pronouns to refer to theologians and feminine ones to refer to philosophers, though both
groups include both sexes.
4. I cannot even begin to give adequate documentation for this claim. But consider the
importance of movements in contemporary theology which take the center of Christianity
to be ending oppression and achieving a more just order: liberation theology, black
theology, feminist theology, and ecological theology. Consider too John Hick's judgment
that the major religions are "centrally concerned with a radical transformation of the
human situation," which Christians term salvatioll ("Religious Pluralism and Salvation,"
Faith and Philosophy, 5/4 [October 1988], p. 365). I suggest that Hick's judgment expresses
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the views of many contemporary theologians, notably those whom Kaufman exemplifies.
Such a concern has important roots in the Christian tradition (e.g., Matt 7:20-21).
5. He uses the fonnal mode in several places: e.g., "the ultimate mystery, a mystery
which we may (in faith) choose to call 'God'" (44); "the image/concept 'God' seems
intended to symbolize that-whatever it might be-which brings true human fulfillment"
(43); and several similar locutions on pp. 43-44.
6. This too is more hinted at than explicitly developed in the article. But Kaufman speaks
of a "sphere which we humans can (and should) largely control" (44) in contrast with
something like the sphere of God, which humans cannot and should not try to control.
Moreover, the confident way he uses historical findings as well as this quote suggest to
me that he would distinguish the degree of justification we have for our judgments on
different subjects.
7. This distinction might also provide a basis for a reply to another inconsistency with
which Stump and Kretzmann charge Kaufman: "claiming that we can't know that some
moral views are of more value than others in helping us sort out major issues" (336) while
at the same time confidently pronouncing certain things (e.g., the holocaust and environmental damage) as evils. I suggest that Kaufman might claim to be more justified in
making judgments about particular evils than in holding general theories about the nature
of good and evil or about purported underlying causes of particular evils (e.g., the Christian
idea of original sin or the Buddhist idea of tanha [craving]).
8. This suggests a reply to Stump and Kretzmann's criticism of Kaufman's claim that
we dare not claim that our concepts of God were directly revealed by God (44). They
charge him with inconsistency, for his claim implies that he knows that God did not
directly reveal them (336). But suppose it is true that concepts of God reflect the cultures
of their fonnulators. Then either the concepts were chosen by their fonnulators or God
used concepts which would fit well with the culture when God revealed various things.
In either case we should expect to think and speak about God by means of concepts which
fit our culture, not concepts fonnulated in different cultures. Moreover, if we are therefore
not obliged to use the latter, the statement that we dare not claim that any of our concepts
of God were directly revealed might be one way to resist any who would use the contrary
claim as a basis for requiring that we use certain concepts. Once again, the focus on the
effects of holding certain beliefs would lend additional justification to Kaufman's way of
stating his claim, even if it is inconsistent with the claim that we know nothing about God.
(Of course, it would not be necessary to state the claim as Kaufman has; my point is only
that his way of stating it becomes understandable and, I think, less objectionable than
Stump and Kretzmann find it.)
9. This confessional approach implies that Stump and Kretzmann are not quite right in
claiming that the relativist theologian must deny the truth-claims of adherents of other
traditions and thus was no more tolerant than were non-relativists. For he need not unambiguously deny their claims. While he must deny that they are justified in claiming to have so accurate
an understanding of the ultimate mystery as to imply that everyone else should adopt their
understanding, he can grant that they may well have a way of understanding that mystery which
enables them to relate as effectively and as savingly to it as does the Christian's way.
Whether this would be enough to satisfy them depends, of course, on how they understand
their own claims.

